API and alert access

Every record, whether served over the API, sent in an alert, or shown on its permanent page, carries the same fields. Sample size, baseline and confidence travel with the record so a figure can never be read out of context.

{
  "event_ref": "PNT-EVT-000123",
  "synthetic": false,
  "status": "ended",
  "event_type": "jamming",
  "evidence_class": "Jamming-consistent ADS-B anomaly",
  "confidence": "medium",
  "severity": "medium",
  "started_at_utc": "2026-07-14T09:12:00Z",
  "ended_at_utc": "2026-07-14T10:48:00Z",
  "region": "Greater Manchester",
  "grid_cell": "53.5,-2.5",
  "peak_pct_low_nic": 41.2,
  "sample_aircraft": "14/34",
  "sensors_involved": ["MAN-1", "MAN-2"],
  "local_baseline": "7-day rolling low-NIC proportion for this cell: 3.1%",
  "persistence": "8 consecutive 60s windows above the cell baseline",
  "data_latency": "under 60s per window",
  "methodology_version": "v1.0",
  "cryptographic_proof": "pending, ML-DSA signing rolling out"
}

Events are pushed on open, on revision and on close. Deliveries are signed so the receiver can authenticate them, and are retried on non-2xx responses.

POST https://your-endpoint.example/pntmap
Content-Type: application/json
X-PNTMAP-Signature: <HMAC-SHA256 of the raw body>

{
  "delivery_id": "d_01J8ZC5Q0000",
  "sent_at_utc": "2026-07-14T10:49:03Z",
  "type": "event.closed",
  "event": { /* the event object shown above */ }
}

Records are classified on the published evidence ladder, and the class travels in the payload:

• ADS-B integrity anomaly: A statistically unusual cluster of aircraft reporting degraded navigation integrity. Cause not established.
• Jamming-consistent ADS-B anomaly: A persistent, spatially bounded integrity degradation whose shape is consistent with a ground-based emitter. No direct RF measurement available, so jamming is not asserted.
• RF-corroborated jamming: An ADS-B integrity signature accompanied by a direct GNSS-band RF measurement from a PNTMAP node covering the same volume and period.
• Position inconsistency: Reported position or timing inconsistent with observed geometry, seen by a single node. No cause implied.
• Multisensor-corroborated position inconsistency: The same inconsistency between reported position/timing and observed geometry is seen independently by two or more nodes.
• Spoofing-consistent anomaly: A corroborated inconsistency whose pattern, for example aircraft converging on identical false solutions, is consistent with spoofing. Spoofing is not asserted.
• RF-corroborated suspected spoofing: A spoofing-consistent anomaly accompanied by a direct GNSS-band RF measurement from a node covering the same volume and period.
• Confirmed spoofing: Reserved for controlled tests, waveform-level evidence, or incidents independently verified by a third party. Never assigned automatically by the platform.

Full definitions and thresholds are in the methodology (v1.0).

Coverage is exactly the reception footprint of the live nodes shown on the network page. No data is produced outside that footprint, and absence of an event outside it carries no information. Coverage figures in this service always come from the same canonical network snapshot that drives the public map.

Event records are permanent and individually addressable. Corrections are published as revisions on the record rather than silent edits, and the revision history is part of the payload. Underlying per-observation telemetry retention: [DECISION NEEDED]. Depth of historical event access available to subscribers: [DECISION NEEDED].

Webhook push, email notification, and polling the event endpoint. Delivery is per subscription and can be filtered by region, evidence class, confidence and severity.

Access is licensed for the subscriber's own operational, safety, underwriting or investigative use. Redistribution, resale and public republication of full records require written agreement. PNTMAP™ records are evidence of observed ADS-B integrity degradation; they are not a navigation service and must not be used for real-time flight guidance. See the terms.

Node telemetry is authenticated per node with server-side validated keys and rate limits. Processing and storage are UK/EU based, with the platform operated by Decent Cybersecurity Ltd (London). Evidence-provenance architecture, including planned ML-DSA signing and anchoring, is published on Verify Evidence.

Contractual latency and availability targets: [DECISION NEEDED]. Commercial model and pricing: [DECISION NEEDED].

Use the contact form stating the intended use, required coverage and delivery method.